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Abstract
In previous work (G. Bonanno, Rational choice and AGM belief re-
vision, Artificial Intelligence, 2009) a semantics for AGM belief revision
was proposed based on choice frames, borrowed from the rational choice
literature. In this paper we discuss how to use choice frames to ana-
lyze extensive-form games. Given an extensive form with perfect recall,
a choice frame can be used to represent a player’s initial beliefs and her
disposition to change those beliefs when she is informed that it is her turn
to move. When some players move more than once along some play of
the game, the issue of iterated belief revision arises. We provide a se-
mantics for iterated belief revision in terms of choice frames and provide
an outline of how to use choice frames to analyze solution concepts for
extensive-form games.
Keywords: Choice function, AGM belief revision, extensive-form game,
iterated belief revision
1 Introduction
In [5] the notion of AGM-consistent choice frame was proposed as a semantics
for the theory of one-stage belief revision put forward by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors
and Makinson [1]. In this paper we discuss how to use choice frames to analyze
extensive-form games. Given an extensive form with perfect recall, a choice
frame can be used to represent a player’s initial beliefs and her disposition to
change those beliefs when she is informed that it is her turn to move. When
some players move more than once along some play of the game, the issue of
∗Part of this paper was presented at the Workshop on " Language, Communication and
Rational Agency", Stanford, May 30, 2009.
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iterated belief revision arises. We provide a semantics for iterated belief revision
in terms of choice frames and provide an outline of how to use choice frames to
analyze solution concepts for extensive-form games.
2 AGM belief revision and choice frames
In this section we briefly review the AGM theory of belief revision ([1], [8]) and
its semantics based on choice frames ([5]).
Let Φ be the set of formulas of a propositional language based on a countable
set of atoms. Given a subset K ⊆ Φ, its deductive closure, denoted by [K], is
defined as follows: ψ ∈ [K] if and only if there exist φ1, ..., φn ∈ K (with n ≥ 0)
such that (φ1∧ ...∧φn)→ ψ is a tautology. A set K ⊆ Φ is deductively closed if
K = [K] and it is consistent if [K] = Φ. Let K be a consistent and deductively
closed set representing the agent’s initial beliefs and let Ψ ⊆ Φ be a set of
formulas representing possible items of information. A belief revision function
based on K is a function BK : Ψ→ 2
Φ (where 2Φ denotes the set of subsets of
Φ) that associates with every formula φ ∈ Ψ (thought of as new information) a
set BK(φ) ⊆ Φ (thought of as the revised beliefs). If Ψ = Φ then BK is called
a partial belief revision function, while if Ψ = Φ then BK is called a full belief
revision function.
Let BK : Ψ→ 2
Φ be a (partial) belief revision function and B
∗
K : Φ→ 2
Φ a
full belief revision function. We say that B
∗
K is an extension of BK if, for every
φ ∈ Ψ, B
∗
K(φ) = BK(φ).
A full belief revision function is called an AGM function if it satisfies the
following properties, known as the AGM postulates: ∀φ,ψ ∈ Φ,
(AGM1) BK(φ) = [BK(φ)].
(AGM2) φ ∈ BK(φ).
(AGM3) BK(φ) ⊆ [K ∪ {φ}].
(AGM4) if ¬φ /∈ K, then [K ∪ {φ}] ⊆ BK(φ).
(AGM5) BK(φ) = Φ if and only if φ is a contradiction.
(AGM6) if φ↔ ψ is a tautology then BK(φ) = BK(ψ).
(AGM7) BK(φ ∧ ψ) ⊆ [BK(φ) ∪ {ψ}] .
(AGM8) if ¬ψ /∈ BK(φ), then [BK(φ) ∪ {ψ}] ⊆ BK(φ ∧ ψ).
AGM1 requires the revised belief set to be deductively closed. AGM2 requires
that the information be believed. AGM3 says that beliefs should be revised
minimally, in the sense that no new formula should be added unless it can be
deduced from the information received and the initial beliefs. AGM4 says that if
the information received is compatible with the initial beliefs, then any formula
that can be deduced from the information and the initial beliefs should be part
of the revised beliefs. AGM5 requires the revised beliefs to be consistent, unless
the information φ is a contradiction (that is, ¬φ is a tautology). AGM6 requires
that if φ is propositionally equivalent to ψ then the result of revising by φ be
identical to the result of revising by ψ. AGM7 and AGM8 are a generalization
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of AGM3 and AGM4 that requires BK(φ ∧ ψ) to be the same as the expansion
of BK(φ) by ψ, as long as ψ is compatible with BK(φ).
Choice frames provide a set-theoretic semantics for belief revision functions.
Definition 1 A choice frame is a triple 〈Ω, E, f〉 where
Ω is a non-empty set of states; subsets of Ω are called events.
E ⊆ 2Ω is a collection of events such that ∅ /∈ E and Ω ∈ E.
f : E → 2Ω is a function that associates with every event E ∈ E an event
f(E) satisfying the following properties: (1) f(E) ⊆ E and (2) f(E) = ∅.
In rational choice theory a set E ∈ E is interpreted as a set of available
alternatives and f(E) is interpreted as the subset of E which consists of the
chosen alternatives (see, for example, [16] and [17]). In our case, we think of the
elements of E as possible items of information and the interpretation of f(E)
is that, if informed that event E has occurred, the agent considers as possible
all and only the states in f(E). The set f(Ω) is interpreted as the set of states
that are initially considered possible.
In order to interpret a choice frame 〈Ω, E, f〉 in terms of belief revision we
need to add a valuation V : A→ 2Ω that associates with every atomic formula
p ∈ A the set of states at which p is true. The quadruple 〈Ω, E, f, V 〉 is called
a model (or an interpretation) of 〈Ω, E, f〉. Given a model M = 〈Ω, E, f, V 〉,
truth of an arbitrary formula at a state is defined recursively as follows (ω |=M φ
means that formula φ is true at state ω in model M):
(1) for p ∈ A, ω |=M p if and only if ω ∈ V (p),
(2) ω |=M ¬φ if and only if ω |=M φ and
(3) ω |=M (φ ∨ ψ) if and only if either ω |=M φ or ω |=M ψ (or both).
The truth set of formula φ in model M is denoted by ‖φ‖
M
, that is, ‖φ‖
M
=
{ω ∈ Ω : ω |=M φ}.
Given a model M = 〈Ω, E, f, V 〉 we say that
• the agent initially believes that ψ if and only if f(Ω) ⊆ ‖ψ‖
M
,
• the agent believes that ψ upon learning that φ if and only if (1) ‖φ‖
M
∈ E
and (2) f(‖φ‖
M
) ⊆ ‖ψ‖
M
.
Accordingly, we can associate with every model a (partial) belief revision
function as follows. Let
KM = {φ ∈ Φ : f(Ω) ⊆ ‖φ‖M} ,
ΨM = {φ ∈ Φ : ‖φ‖M ∈ E} ,
BKM : ΨM → 2
Φ be given by BKM(φ) = {ψ ∈ Φ : f(‖φ‖M) ⊆ ‖ψ‖M} .
(1)
What properties must a choice frame satisfy in order for it to be the case
that the (typically partial) belief revision function associated with an arbitrary
3
interpretation of it can be extended to a full AGM belief revision function? This
question motivates the following definition.
Definition 2 A choice frame 〈Ω, E, f〉 is AGM-consistent if, for every model
M = 〈Ω, E, f, V 〉 based on it, the (partial) belief revision function BKM asso-
ciated with M (see (1)) can be extended to a full belief revision function that
satisfies the AGM postulates.
Recall that a binary relation  on Ω is a total pre-order if it is complete
(∀ω, ω′ ∈ Ω, either ω  ω′ or ω′  ω) and transitive (∀ω, ω′, ω′′ ∈ Ω, if ω  ω′
and ω′  ω′′ then ω  ω′′).
Definition 3 A choice frame 〈Ω,E , f〉 is rationalizable if there exists a total
pre-order  on Ω such that, for every E ∈ E,
f(E) = {ω ∈ E : ω  ω′,∀ω′ ∈ E}.
The interpretation of ω  ω′ is that state ω is at least as plausible as state
ω′. The following proposition is proved in [5]:
Proposition 4 Let 〈Ω,E , f〉 be a choice frame where Ω is finite. Then the
following are equivalent:
(a) 〈Ω, E, f〉 is AGM-consistent,
(b) 〈Ω, E, f〉 is rationalizable.
On the basis of Proposition 4, rationalizable choice frames can be viewed as
providing a semantics for one-stage belief revision functions that obey the AGM
postulates. In the next section we turn to iterated belief revision.
3 Iterated belief revision
Iterated belief revision, that is, the evolution of beliefs over time in response
to sequences of informational inputs, has been investigated extensiveley in the
literature (see, for example, [6], [7], [10]). AGM belief revision functions map
a belief set K ⊆ Φ and an informational input φ ∈ Φ into a new belief set
BK(φ) ⊆ Φ. While such functions are sufficient for modeling one-stage belief
revision, it has been argued (see, for example, [10] and [15]) that, in the context
of iterated belief revision, one should model the evolutions of belief states (or
epistemic states), rather than simply of belief sets. A belief state is a pair
(K,BK), consisting of a belief set togehter with a disposition to revise one’s
beliefs, as captured by the belief revision function BK . Thus iterated belief
revision should be construed as a function that maps a belief state (K,BK)
and an informational input φ into a new belief state (K ′, B′K). In particular,
one should allow for the possibility that, after learning that φ one changes his
disposition to revise one’s beliefs; in other words, in general it is possible that
B′K = BK .
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Fix the set of states Ω. A choice frame 〈Ω, E, f〉 incorporates both the
initial beliefs and the disposition to revise those beliefs; thus it can be regarded
as representing a belief state. In accordance with the view expressed above,
iterated belief revision can be captured semantically by a pair 〈C,B〉 where C is
a set of choice frames and B is a function that maps a pair consisting of a choice
frame 〈Ω, E , f〉 ∈ C and an information input E ∈ E into a new choice frame in
C. We call the pair 〈C,B〉 an iterated choice structure. We require that, for all
〈Ω, E, f〉 ∈ C, B (〈Ω, E, f〉 ,Ω) = 〈Ω, E, f〉, that is, the trivial information Ω does
not change the agent’s belief state. Furthermore, if 〈Ω, E ′, f ′〉 = B (〈Ω, E, f〉 , E),
consistency requires that
f ′(Ω) = f(E) (2)
In fact, if athe agent’s initial beliefs are f(Ω) and he learns that E, then his
revised beliefs are f(E) and these constitute the initial beliefs in the new belief
state 〈Ω, E ′, f ′〉, namely f ′(Ω).
Definition 5 An iterated choice structure 〈C,B〉 is AGM-consistent if every
choice frame 〈Ω, E, f〉 ∈ C is AGM-consistent (see Definition 2).
From now on we shall restrict attention to AGM-consistent iterated choice
structures.
Iterated choice structures can be represented by means of rooted trees. Let
t0 be the root of the tree. Associate with it the initial belief state 〈Ω, E, f〉 . For
every E ∈ E draw an arrow out of t0 leading to a new node t and associate with
t the choice frame 〈Ω, E ′, f ′〉 = B (〈Ω, E, f〉 , E) and proceed similarly for every
E′ ∈ E ′.
If 〈Ω, E ′, f ′〉 = B (〈Ω, E, f〉 , E) (with E ∈ E) with abuse of notation we shall
denote f ′ by Bf,E (thus Bf,E : E
′ → 2Ω). The following lemma highlights a
property of AGM-consistent iterated choice structures.1
Lemma 6 Let 〈Ω, E, f〉 be a choice frame and E,F ∈ E be such that F ⊆ E
and f(E) ∩ F = ∅. Let 〈Ω, E ′, f ′〉 = B (〈Ω, E, f〉 ,E) and suppose that F ∈ E ′.
Then if both 〈Ω, E, f〉 and 〈Ω, E ′, f ′〉 are AGM-consistent, f ′(F ) = f(F ). More
succintly:
if F ⊆ E and f(E) ∩ F = ∅ then Bf,E(F ) = f(F ). (3)
Lemma 6 says that, when F ⊆ E, if the agent is first informed that E and
in his revised beliefs he does not rule out F , then, if he is next informed that
F , the propositions that he believes are the same as the ones that he would
have believed had he been informed that F to start with. Lemma 6 has no bite
(and thus is trivialy satisfied) if the condition f(E)∩F = ∅ does not hold. We
1 The proof of Lemma 6 is omitted. It can be found in the extended
version of this paper, which will be posted on the author’s web page
(http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/bonanno/).
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shall assume the following strenghtening of (3) (obtained by dropping the clause
f(E) ∩ F = ∅):
if F ⊆ E then Bf,E(F ) = f(F ). (4)
According to (4) the agent will hold the same beliefs no matter whether he
is informed that F right away or whether he is first informed that E and then
that F, whenever F ⊆ E. Note that this principle is implied by the best-known
theories of iterated belief revision (see, for example, [6], [7], [10]).
We shall now restrict attention to iterated choice structures that satisfy the
following property, which we call information refinement :
if 〈Ω, E ′, f ′〉 = B (〈Ω, E, f〉 , E) then, for every S ∈ E ′, S ⊆ E. (5)
Information refinement says that if the agent is first informed that E and,
later on, is informed that F , then F ⊆ E. Hence the agent never receives
information that contradicts earlier information. Note, however, that (5) does
not rule out the possibility that every new piece of information contradicts the
agent’s previous beliefs.
It will be shown in the next section that the property of information refine-
ment is satisfied in extensive-form games with perfect recall.
Applying the iterated belief revision principle (4) to iterated choice struc-
tures that satisfy information refinement we obtain the following property. Let
 be the total pre-order on Ω that rationalizes the choice frame 〈Ω, E, f〉 (see
Proposition 4), that is, for every S ∈ E, f(S) = {ω ∈ S : ω  x,∀x ∈ S}. Let
E ∈ E and 〈Ω, E ′, f ′〉 = B (〈Ω, E, f〉 , E). Then
∀T ∈ E ∩ E ′, f ′(T ) = f(T ) = {ω ∈ T : ω  x,∀x ∈ T} (6)
that is, the same total pre-order  rationalizes both f(T ) and f ′(T ). The above
considerations motivate the following definition.
Definition 7 An iterated choice structure with information refinement 〈C,B〉 is
rationalizable if there exists a total pre-order  of Ω such that, for every choice
frame 〈Ω, E , f〉 ∈ C and for every E ∈ E , f(E) = {ω ∈ E : ω  x,∀x ∈ E}.
Thus a rationalizable iterated choice structure with information refinement
〈C,B〉 is equivalent to a one-stage choice frame 〈Ω, E, f〉 where E is the union of
the domains of the choice frames that belong to C. For example, let 〈C,B〉 be
the following iterated choice structure: C = { 〈Ω, E1, f1〉 , 〈Ω, E2, f2〉 , 〈Ω, E3, f3〉}
with E1 = {Ω, E, F}, E2 = {Ω, E1,E2}, E3 = {Ω, F1, F2} and, for k = 1, 2,
Ek ⊆ E and Fk ⊆ F ; B (〈Ω, E1, f1〉 , E) = 〈Ω, E2, f2〉 and B (〈Ω, E1, f1〉 , F ) =
〈Ω, E3, f3〉. Then 〈C,B〉 is equivalent to the choice frame 〈Ω, E, f〉 where E =
E1 ∪ E2 ∪ E3 and f is defined by f(S) = {ω ∈ S : ω  x,∀x ∈ S} (for every
S ∈ E),where  is the total pre-order that rationalizes 〈C,B〉.
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4 Choice frames and extensive-form games
We shall use the history-based definition of extensive-form game (see [11]).2
Let A be a set of actions and A∗ the set of finite sequences in A. If h =
〈a1, ..., ak〉 ∈ A
∗ and j ≤ k, the sequence h′ = 〈a1, ..., aj〉 is called a prefix of h.
If h = 〈a1, ..., ak〉 ∈ A∗ and a ∈ A, we denote the sequence 〈a1, ..., ak, a〉 by ha.
A finite extensive form is a tuple
〈
H,N,P, p0, {≈i}i∈N
〉
:3
• A finite set of histories H ⊆ A∗ which is closed under prefixes (that is, if
h ∈ H and h′ ∈ A∗ is a prefix of h, then h′ ∈ H) and contains the empty
sequence ∅. A history h ∈ H such that, for every a ∈ A, ha /∈ H, is called
a terminal history. The set of terminal histories is denoted by Z. Let
D = H \ Z denote the set of nonterminal or decision histories. For every
history h ∈ H, we denote by A(h) the set of actions available at h, that
is, A(h) = {a ∈ A : ha ∈ H}. Thus A(h) = ∅ if and only if h ∈ D.
• A finite set N = {1, ...n} of players. An additional player, denoted by 0
and called chance or nature, might also be added.
• A function P : D → N ∪ {0} that assigns a player to each nonterminal
history. Thus P (h) is the player who moves at history h. A game is
said to be without chance moves if P (h) = 0 for every h ∈ D. For every
i ∈ N ∪ {0}, let Di = P
−1(i) be the histories assigned to player i. Thus
{D0,D1, ...,Dn} is a partition of D.
• A function p0 that associates with every h ∈ D0 a probability distribution
over A(h).
• For each player i ∈ N , an equivalence relation ≈i on Di. The interpreta-
tion of h ≈i h
′ is that, when choosing an action at history h ∈ Di, player i
does not know whether she is moving at h or at h′. The equivalence class
of h ∈ Di is denoted by Ii(h) and is called an information set of player
i; thus Ii(h) = {h
′ ∈ Di : h ≈i h
′}. The following restriction applies:
if h′ ∈ Ii(h) then A(h′) = A(h), that is, the set of actions available to a
player is the same at any two histories that belong to the same information
set of that player.
• The following property, known as perfect recall, is satisfied: for every
player i ∈ N , if h1, h2 ∈ Di, a ∈ A(h
1) and h1a is a prefix of h2 then for
every h′ ∈ Ii(h
2) there exists an h ∈ Ii(h
1) such that ha is a prefix of h′.
2 Similar structures were introduced in the computer science literature by Parikh and Ra-
manujam ([13], [14]; see also [12]). These sructures are more general than extensive-form
games in that they specify a player’s information at every node, that is, not only at nodes
where the player himself has to move. Hoewever, as shown in [2] and [3], it is possible to
extend the definition of extensive-form game by specifying, for every node, the information
that every player has at that node.
3 Given an extensive form, one obtains an extensive game by adding, for every player i ∈ N
a utility or payoff function Ui : Z → R (where R denotes the set of real numbers and Z the
set of terminal histories).
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Intuitively, perfect recall requires a player to remember what he knew in
the past and what actions he took previously.4
Given an extensive form, we can associate with every player i a (possibly
iterated) choice frame 〈Ω, Ei, fi〉 as follows: Ω = H (the set of histories), E ∈ Ei
if and only if either E = H or E consists of an information set of player i .
Recall that, if h ∈ Di, player i’s information set that contains h is denoted by
Ii(h).
Thus
Ei = {H} ∪ {Ii(h) : h ∈ Di}. (7)
Finally, the function fi provides conditional beliefs about past and future
moves.
If we assume that the (iterated) choice frame of player i is rationalizable,
then there exists a total pre-order i such that, r for every E ∈ Ei, fi(E) =
{h ∈ E : h i h
′,∀h′ ∈ E}.
What are natural properties to impose on these choice frames, that is, on
the associated (conditional) beliefs? We shall propose three properties.
The first property says that the continuation of a history h cannot be more
plausible than h itself:
∀h ∈ D, ∀a ∈ A(h), h i ha. (P2)
The second property says that every history has some continuation which is
at least as plausible as the history itself and, furthermore, such action must be
the same for any two histories that belong to the same information set:
∀h ∈ D,∃a ∈ A(h) :
(1) ha i h and (2) if h
′ ∈ Ij(h) for some j ∈ N then h
′a i h
′.
(P3)
The third property says that the relative plausibility of past moves is not
reversed by the observation of a new move:
∀h, h′ ∈ D, if h′ ∈ Ij(h) for some j ∈ N , then,
∀a ∈ A(h), h i h′ ⇐⇒ ha i h′a.
, (P4)
In the extended version of this paper these properties are used, in conjunc-
tion with other properties, to characterize solutions concepts for extensive-form
games, in particular the notion of sequential equilibrium introduced in [9].
4 For an in-dept analysis on the notion of perfect recall see [4].
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